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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to derive a simultaneous 
equation model of an urban economy in which the impacts of 
environmental policy on the suburbanization-reurbanization 
process can be assessed. The variable to show these effects 
is a measure of the density of land-use activity. The model 
consists of essentially four components -- an urban land mar- 
ket, a market for an aggregate good, a description of a pro- 
cess of emission of residuals as a necessary by-product of 
land-use activities (production, consumption, commuting), 
and their accumulation and diffusion in a receiving medium 
(e.g., air and noise pollution). 
Environmental policy is then introduced into this simul- 
taneous equation model (emission standards and fines, ordinances 
to install abatement equipment, emission fees, etc.). A dis- 
cussion follows on the hypothesis that a successful antipollu- 
tion policy could introduce a trend toward reurbanization with 
the claim that clear air could induce land users to relocate 
closer to the center of a city. 
The policies considered include fines for exceeding emission 
standards, inducing land users to purchase abatement devices in 
the market. The study attempts to derive the impacts of these 
measures on residuals' concentration, the roles of abatement 
devices, and urban density based on some a prior; assumptions. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ABATEMENT, AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Several land value studies (such as Anderson and 
Crocker, 1371) undertaken in highly industrialized countries 
show that environmental quality plays an ever increasing role 
in the choice of location by urban land users, particularly 
households and some (usually service-oriented) firms. The 
most important factors of environmental quality in an urban 
area are usually the levels of air and noise pollution, which 
are the effects of the levels and density of land-use activities. 
Low concentration of residuals -- a stock variable -- can 
be found mostly in the suburban areas of a city. The flow 
variables determining the stock of residuals at a given location 
are emissions (depending on activity levels and density), and 
the diffusion and absorption by the environment. As residual 
density is usually lower in the suburbs, we expect its concen- 
tration to decrease as the distance from the city center in- 
creases. 
The concentration of residuals, among other factors, has 
led to an accelerated suburbanization process, the results of 
which are ever increasing energy costs, inner city problems, 
and rising total pollution (v.d. Berg, et al., 1981). 
Suppose now that a city authority takes steps to reduce 
emissions in order to improve environmental quality within 
the city's boundaries. (In this paper the measures applied 
are not differentiated by location.) If this policy turns 
out to be successful, - one of the incentives to locate in the 
suburbs -- better environmental quality -- has vanished. As 
the locations closer to town become more accessible and trans- 
portation costs become smaller, there may be a side effect of 
environmental policy leading to a process of reurbanization. 
In a continuous process of income growth, however, where 
larger lots and new homes play the essential role in the 
location decision, it is to be suspected that the claimed 
effect will be over-compensated again. 
In this paper an analytical model, based on a priori 
reasoning, is proposed that assesses the effects of various 
policy measures on population density. Since the model is 
basically a static one, only comparative static results are 
obtained (Schuber, 1979). We will restrict ourselves to the 
assessment of the impact of an urban environmental policy 
that attempts to curb the emissions of pollutants in the 
urban area by means of obligatory or voluntary installation 
of abatement devices. It should be added at this point, that 
the model outlined is, in principle, empirically testable. 
A thorough econometric analysis has so far been prevented 
by the lack of data, especially on policy measures.(Some pre- 
liminary first tests based on Austrian data have been carried 
out, but will not be reported here.) 
2. A MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN AN URBAN AREA 
2.1. Basic Assumptions 
Six basic assumptions are adhered to in our model. 
- Following the von Thilnen-Alonso (1826; 1965) analysis, 
we assume the model city to be situated on a homogeneous 
plain. 
- We then postulate a "neutral" residual-receiving medium 
(i.e. in the case of air and noise pollution, no pre- 
dominant direction of winds). 
- All transactions take place in the center of town where 
consumers and producers have to go for their "trans- 
acting". (Strictly speaking, since all firms are not 
in the center of town, we assume that the "labor market" 
is in the central business district [CBD], and that 
workers commute first to this area and then to their 
place of work. Although this assumption may not 
always be realistic, it does simplify the analysis 
considerably. 1 
- To determine the activity levels of producers and con- 
sumers, we assume that households maximize utility, 
given an income constraint, and producers maximize 
profits, given a production function. 
- The decisions made by the city government remain exo- 
genous throughout the analysis. 
- Our final assumption is that the land market is an 
example of monopolistic competition. This implies 
that locations are differentiated by their characteris- 
tics and that bargaining establishes their price 
(following Alonso's "game theoretic" approach). 
2.2. Components of the Model 
C o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  r e s i d u a l s  ( R )  
Environmental quality can be described by the distribu- 
tion of residuals [R(r)] over the urban area (in a stationary 
state). The quality will depend on total emissions, .- 
which are caused by the land-use activities ' consumption, 
production, and commuting to the center, and on the physical 
processes'"diffusion" and "absorption". 
The urban  land  marke t  ( q )  
The supply of land in a given zone is fixed (in a circular 
city: 2rn). Demand for land is derived from utility and pro- 
fit maximization. Among other variables it will depend on 
environmental quality and accessibiltiy of the CBD. 
The goods marke t  ( X )  
To facilitate the analysis, the total supply of consump- 
tion goods XI is assumed to be produced in the urban region 
(activity levels of firms = supply of X). This supply function 
(derived from the profit maximum conditions) depends again on 
accessibility and for some firms on environmental quality. It 
also depends on the factor market conditions, which are exo- 
genously given. Demand depends on income (exogenous) and, 
indirectly, on environmental quality and accessibility (among 
other variables) . 
E m i s s i o n s  
All land-use activities cause emissions,which are consi- 
dered as the part of waste that is "harmful" (i.e., which 
causes negative externalities), to be deposited in a common 
property resource where they accumulate. For our analysis 
we consider the predominant property resource to be air. 
T h e  city's administration 
Urban planning in this context plays two roles: that of 
providing the transportation infrastructure (thus influencing 
accessibility) and that of applying various antipollution 
schemes. The activities of the administration are not space- 
consuming in the context of this paper, thus urban land users 
are only households and firms. 
2.3. The Micro-economic Background of the Demand for Land and 
the Determination of Activity Levels 
Potential land users evaluate offers an the real estate 
market by assessing the different characteristics of the 
various offers. Out of the entire range of such possible 
characteristics, we will only consider two "broad categories" 
(Richardson, 1978): accessibility and environmental quality. 
"Location" is seen as a good produced essentially by two 
agents, the city administration and all land users (BBkemann, 
1977). 
Accessibility is "produced" by the urban planner, but 
when certain capacity thresholds are surpassed and congestion 
begins to be a problem, all commuters contribute to "accessi- 
biltiy". It will be measured, therefore, in terms of travel 
time from a land user's location to the city center (A) . 
Environmental quality is "produced" by the emissions of 
all urban land users, these being caused by the land-use 
activities. The city administration plays an indirect role 
by applying environmental policy measures. Environmental 
quality, will be measured by some aggregate index of various 
noxious residuals(R). 
Househo Zds 
The u t i l i t y  of a  household  i s  g iven  by: 
u= u  (X,q,A,R) 
i t s  income c o n s t r a i n t :  
where 
income 
l e v e l  of  a g g r e g a t e  consumption good 
s i z e  o f  l o t  
p o l l u t i o n  abatement  d e v i c e s  
e m i s s i o n s  ( caused  by consumption of  X and cornmuting 
a  d i s t a n c s  of  r t o  t h e  c e n t e r )  
p r i c e s  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  
d i s t a n c e  from t h e  c e n t e r  
E q u i l i b r i u m  of t h e  household i s  found by maximizing u ,  sub- 
ject t o  y t  where A and R a r e  exogenously  g i v e n ,  v a r y i n g  w i t h  
r.  s e t t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  e q u a l  t o  z e r o  and 
s o l v i n g  f o r  X and q y i e l d s  demand f u n c t i o n s  f o r  X and q ,  
X depending on p , pq, y ,  TC, A and R ( w e  p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  
second o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  h o l d ) :  
and X xD = xD ( p  t pgt y t  TC, A t  R) 
W e  e x p e c t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  " s e n s i t i v i t i e s "  t o  changes  i n  t h e s e  
v a r i a b l e s  ( t n e y  c a n n o t ,  a s  u s u a l ,  be r i g o r o u s l y  d e r i v e d  
from t h e  common micro-economic r e g u l a r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s )  : 
and s i m i l a r l y  
Firms 
X 9 P r o f i t s :  P = p  X - (wL + p q + TC). 
The p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i s :  
x = f  ( L , ~ , A , R )  
E = E O : , r )  
wnere : 
.... o u t p u t  of  consumption goods 
L  .... non-land p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r s  
p . . . . p r i c e s  
w .... wage r a t e  
The f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a  2 r o f i t  maximum can b e  s o l v e d  
t o  y i e l d  a s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  X and demand f u n c t i o n s  f o r  
q and L. (As  t h e  f a c t o r  market  w i l l  be assumed t o  b e  i n  e q u i l i -  
br ium, it w i l l  n o t  be a n a l y z e d  any f u r t h e r .  
where: 
2 . 4 .  Emiss ions  and t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  R e s i d u a l s  o v e r  
t h e  Urban Area 
There a r e  t h r e e  land-use  a c t i v i t i e s  c a u s i n g  e m i s s i o n s :  
- P r o d u c t i o n  and consumpt ion of  t h e  " a g g r e g a t e "  good ( a c t i v i t y  
l e v e l :  X) 
- Commuting t o  t h e  c e n t e r  of  t h e  c i t y  
- T r a n s a c t i o n s  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  (which w e  w i l l  assume t o  be  
c o n s t a n t ,  s o  t h e y  w i l l  b e  l e f t  o u t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s ) .  
A c t i v i t i e s  c o n s t i t u t e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  -- " i n p u t s "  
a r e  t u r n e d  i n t o  " o u t p u t s "  -- some o f  which can  be  used f u r t h e r  
("consumption goods" )  and w a s t e .  I n  t e r m s  o f  p h y s i c a l  mass ,  
t h e  t o t a l  mass o f  i n p u t s  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  mass of  o u t p u t s .  
P r o d u c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  u s e  p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r s  (raw m a t e r i a l s ,  
e n e r g y ,  e t c . )  which a r e  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  goods and s e r v i c e s  
and was te .  
Households "consume" goods -- i . e . ,  t h e y  a r e  b e i n g  t r a n s -  
formed i n t o  w a s t e .  Commuting t a k e s  e n e r g y  -- which i s  a l s o  
t u r n e d  i n t o  was te .  Some of  t h e  w a s t e ,  however,  is  r e c y c l e d  
o r  is h a r m l e s s ,  some of  it i s  n o x i o u s ,  some of  it c o u l d  be  
t r e a t e d  and t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  somekhing d i r e c t l y  u s e f u l  o r  
better "digestible" for nature. 
The noxious part of waste we will define as"emissions" 
(pollution, residuals). 
E' = E (XI . . . emissions caused by activities pro- 
duction or consum2tion of X 
E commuting = ECO = E (r) (or, with congestion, 
ECO = E (A ; A is traveling time) 
Once residuals are emitted into a common property resource 
they - ac~~imulate and diffuse. Some of them are transformed by 
nature into harmless materials (regeneration), thus reducing 
the stock of pollutants in the receiving medium. Hence, we 
have the following stock-flow relationship: 
wnere: 
R . . . stock of residuals 
ET .;. total emissions of residuals (flow) 
2 (c) . . . rate of natural reqeneration (c is squared for 
mathematical convenience) 
As this total stock of residuals spreads over space, we 
observe varying environmental quality levels at different 
locations. Looking at the movements of pollutant particles 
after emission we observe that they move randomly in all 
d i r e c t i o n s  from t h e  s o u r c e  of  emiss ion .  A s  w e  have exc luded  
any permanent ly  d i s t u r b i n g  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  medium, a  c e r t a i n  
amount, s a y  b, of  t h e  r e s i d u a l s  always moves t o  t h e  " l e f t " ,  
t h e  same amount t o  t h e  " r i g h t "  of  t h e  s o u r c e  ( w e  a r e  t a l k i n g  
abou t  a  one-dimensional  s p a c e  a t  t h e  moment): -bRr moves 
i n  t h e  " p o s i t i v e "  and bRr i n  t h e  " n e g a t i v e "  d i r e c t i o n  ( F e l l e r ,  
A t  a  g i v e n  p o i n t  i n  t i m e ,  t h e n ,  t h e  change i n  t h e  s t o c k  
of  r e s i d u a l s  a t  a  g i v e n  l o c a t i o n  can  come from o t h e r  l o c a t i o n s  
( d i f f u s i o n ) ,  o r  from e m i s s i o n s  ( a t  t h e  l o c a t i o n ) ,  o r  be  due t o  
r e g e n e r a t i o n  ( a t  t h e  l o c a t i o n ) .  The t o t a l  change i n  r e s i d u a l s  
w i t h i n  a n  i n t e r v a l  of d r  t h e n  becomes 
(c12 R ( r  + d r ;  t )  d r  
To o b t a i n  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  r e s i d u a l s  o v e r  
s p a c e  w e  l e t  t + .. , i . e .  k = 0 ( t i m e  d i s a p p e a r s  a s  a  v a r i a b l e :  
Leaving t h e  one-dimensional  space  and t u r n i n g  t o  o u r  c i r c u -  
l a r l y  symmetric c i t y ,  w e  c a n  d e f i n e  l o c a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  of p o l a r  
c o o r d i n a t e s  - b u t  a s  t h e  a n g l e  d o e s  n o t  m a t t e r  (symmetry ! )  w e  
f i n a l l y  o b t a i n  ( s e t t i n g  b  = 1 ,  w i t h o u t  loss of  g e n e r a l i t y )  
( f o r  d e t a i l s ,  see S c h u b e r t ,  1 9 7 9 ) .  W e  assume 3(0) and l i m  R ( r )  
r+rn 
T t o  be f i n i t e ,  and w e  a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t o t a l  e m i s s i o n s  E ( r )  
t o  be E' and E'O. 
Now l e t  t h e r e  be d l a n d  u s e r s  i n  a  g i v e n  r i n g  ( w i t h  
d i s t a n c e  from t h e  c e n t e r  r ) ,  A s  e a c h  l a n d  u s e r  i n  t h i s  
r i n g  h a s  a c t i v i t y  l e v e l  X I  and e m i s s i o n s  E ( X ) ,  t,o o b t a i n  
t o t a l  e m i s s i o n s  i n  t h e  r i n g  w e  have  t o  sum o v e r  a l l  t h e  l a n d  
u s e r s ,  o r t o  s i m p l i f y ,  w e  compute: E ( X )  d = t o t a l  e m i s s i o n s  
d u e  t o  X i n  r i n g  r (where  d ( r )  i s  t h e  number o f  l a n d  u s e r s  
i n  a  g i v e n  r i n g  r ,  and E ( X )  are t h e  a v e r a g e  e m i s s i o n s / l a n d  
u s e r ) .  The e m i s s i o n s  r a t e  d e n s i t y  t h e n  i s  
a s  t h e  t o t a l  a r e a  i n  a  g i v e n  r i n g  i s  2rr. 
CO Each l a n d  u s e r  on  h i s  way t o  t h e  c e n t e r  e m i t s  E  ( r )  i n  
e a c h  r i n g .  How many a r e  p a s s i n g  t h r o u g h  a  g i v e n  r i n g  r ? 
Everybody l o c a t e d  o u t s i d e  r ,  t o w a r d s  t h e  edge  o f  town c o n t r i -  
b u t e s  t o  t o t a l  e m i s s i o n s  a t  r. 
There  a r e ,  s a y ,  N ( r )  l a n d  u s e r s  p a s s i n g  t h r o u g h  r 
(where N i s  t h e  sum o f  a l l  l a n d  u s e r s  d o u t s i d e  r )  . 
T o t a l  commuting e m i s s i o n s :  E'O ( r )  N ( r )  
E m i s s i o n s  ra te  d e n s i t y :  E'O ( I )  N ( r )  
2 r  n 
Note t h a t  E ( X )  a n d  E'O ( r )  are ( p r o v i s i o n a l l y )  exogenous  
i n  t h i s  p a r t i a l  a n a l y s i s .  The s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e q u a t i o n  y i e l d i n g  t h e  p a r t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s i d u a l s  o v e r  
space has to be of the form: 
It can be shown that the solution is of the form: 
R = [ECO1 a N (a) I. (ca) dal KO (cr) 
0 
where rm is the "edge" of the urban region and I. and KO 
are two standard, tabulated Bessel functions, which can be 
roughly drawn as in Figure l(Abramovitz and Stegun, 1972). 
Figure 1. Components of the steady state distribution 
of residuals. 
(Assuming emission-rate densities declining with distance from 
the center, the slope of R will resemble a Gaussian). 
It can be shown that RX, Rd > 0 and Rr < 0, given a decreasing 
emission-rate density toward the periphery of the city. As 
this density (given our assumptions) varies negatively with a 
rising r, the above assertions will hold. (For details, see 
Schubert, 1979). 
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
3 . 1 -  Density and the Land Market 
The total supply of land in a given ring is 2 r ~ .  Demand 
D is equal to qD = q (y, W t P t P  A, R, TC), for all urban 
land users. Bargaining will eliminate all those potential 
land users that do not offer a high enough price at a 
given location. The equiiibrium price of land will hence 
be the simultaneous solution of supply and demand equations - 
i.e. land prices pq will be a function of all exogenous (to 
the land market) variables , 
pq = p' (AIR, y, w, pXt TC. 2rn) 
but as A = A (r) ; TC = TC (r) , and y and w are exogenous, we 
can write: pq = p(R, r, z), 
X 
where: z = (y,w, n , p ) 
The equilibrium solution of the land market will also inform 
us about the number of land users located in a given ring 
3.2. The Goods Market 
Individual demand for and supply of X depends on pX as 
well as the other exogenous variables. Market equilibrium 
implies that the price of XI the solution of the simultaneous 
demand = supply system, depends on the exogenous variables 
X defining supply and demand. Thus p = p(R,r,z). The equili- 
brium quantities of X equal the activity levels causing 
emissions. (To make this step, we had to neglect all imports 
into and exports out of the urban region considered. The 
city's economy constitutes a closed system.) The equilibrium 
activity levels of urban land users hence become 
X 
'=X(YI WI pqI p A, RI TC) 
where 
X and XR cannot be assessed a p r i o r i  -- households demand A 
more X when environment quality (accessibility) drops, firms 
are either not affected at all (by R) or have a decreased 
output. 
4. A SIMULTANEOUS MODEL OF ,XARKETS AND RESIDUAL CONCENTRATION 
IN A CITY 
We have been discussing a feedback system, in which some 
variables were taken as provisionally exogenous to derive 
partial equilibrium conditions and the stationary solution 
of the economic-environmental space/time process (where time 
is considered "short-run" in this formulation) (See Isard and 
Liossatos, 1978). 
R e s i d u a l  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  depends  on a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  o f  
l a n d  u s e r s  and t h e i r  d e n s i t y  -- d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  l a n d  and  
goods  m a r k e t ,  which i n  t u r n  depend on e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y .  
A s  t h i s  model c o n s t i t u t e s  a  s i m p l e  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  t y p e  
o f  model ( w i t h  two goods  i n v o l v e d ) ,  w e  c a n  u s e  W a l r a s ' s  law,  
i . e . ,  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s .  Thus 
where w e  c a n  set  pX = 1 ,  w i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y .  W e  c a n  
now s u b s t i t u t e  p  f o r  pq and pX i n  a l l  e q u a t i o n s  and d r o p  ( 5 ) .  
Is an  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s y s t e m  o f  i m p l i c i t ,  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  e q u a t i o n s  d e f i n e d ;  i . e . ,  a r e  t h e  endogenous  
v a r i a b l e s  R ,  d l  p  and  X d e f i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  exogenous  
v a r i a b l e s  z and r ?  Us ing  t h e  " i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n  theo rem" ,  
w e  have  t o  p o s t u l a t e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  a l l  i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n s  
and t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c o n t i n u o u s  d e r i v a t i v e s .  These  c o n d i t i o n s  
a r e  f u l f i l l e d  by a s s u m p t i o n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  J a c o b i a n  d e t e r -  
m i n a n t  I J I  # 0. 
Let us rewrite the equations in implicit form: 
Table 1 shows [J], the derivatives of these functions with the 
signs in parantheses. 
Table 1 .  The derivatives of the simultaneous, implicit form 
equations. 
The term in brackets is unambiguously positive, the second 
negative (assuming that XR is negligible in quantity). 
The strength of the positive effect depends on r, as the 
magnitude of the first expression varies with r. There 
is, hence, in general a positive and a negative branch of 
the Jacobian and a point where it vanishes, i.e., where 
changes in theexogenous variables do not affect the endo- 
genous variables. To the left and the right of this point, 
effects have opposite signs (see also Figures 2 and 3 ) .  
5. THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MEASURES ON THE 
"GEOGRAPHY" OF A CITY 
5.1. Assessing Density Changes in the Model 
In the previous section a simultaneous model of urban 
land and goods markets was introduced. "Environmental 
quality", the result of the land-use decisions and physical 
processes, was introduced into the evaluation and decision 
calculus of land users. 
Comparing the results of this feedback system to Alonso's 
(1964) and Muth's (1969), weobserve that it is most likely 
that a positive valuation of environmental quality tends to 
"stretch" the city -- a process of suburbanization. The 
price and density gradients (the equilibrium solutions) 
tend to flatten pushing the "edge" of the city outward 
(see ~chubert, 1979). 
Suppose now that the city administration attempts to 
reduce pollution in the urban area. Since the deterioration 
of environmental quality in locations close to the city center 
was one of the driving forces of suburbanization, it could 
well be that a reversal of this process could be the result 
of environmental policy (v.d. Berg, et al., 1981; Edel, 1972). 
To substantiate this claim, we must isolate certain effects, 
i.e., distinguish between the income growth effect behind 
suburbanization (leading to demand for bigger lots) a.nd the 
environmental factor, which drives people out of town and 
into areas of lower residual concentration -- regardless of 
the size of their individual lots. 
How can the effects of environmental policy on urban 
shape be demonstrated? We will use the "density of land- 
use gradient", to show the spatial effects of environmental 
policy. To facilitate the exposition of the claimed hypo- 
theses we make some simplifying assumptions about the shape 
of d. Let d be the usual bell-shaped function as shown in 
Figure 2. The integral of this function is the total popu- 
lation of the urban area. (As our city is symmetric we can 
use a two dimensional curve for illustration.) 
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Figure 2. The distribution of population over urban space. 
Comparing d e n s i t y  p r o f i l e s  w e  c a n  c a l l  a  c i t y  "more compact" ,  
i f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  l i v e s  i n  a  smaller a r e a .  W e  assume 
t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  o u r  model c i t y  d o e s  n o t  change .  
A s  some p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a l t e r e d ,  o n l y  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o v e r  s p a c e  may change .  
A compact  c i t y  h a s  more p e o p l e  l i v i n g  a r o u n d  t h e  c e n t e r  
t h a n  d o e s  a  " d i s p e r s e d "  c i t y  (see F i g u r e  3 ) .  I n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
F i g u r e  3. D e n s i t y  p r o f i l e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  u r b a n  forms.  
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d  depends  on r and t h e  o t h e r  exogenous v a r i a b l e s  (among them 
t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y ) .  L e t  t h i s  set  o f  
v a r i a b l e s  be  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  v e c t o r  z .  W e  have  t h e n  
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Changes in z will cause shifts in d. We claim now that, given 
our assumptions about d, a compact city is characterized by a 
"smaller" standard deviation of the population distribution, 
as is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Urban form in terms of the standard deviation of 
density profiles. 
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Our task is to show how a changes with z .  To facilitate 
the derivation, "characteristic functions" will be used. 
Instead of using the standard deviation CI we can use the 
second moment m2 of the distribution d to show the impact 
of changes in the policy variables z without loss of informa- 
tion (Fisz, 1 9 7 3 ) .  To substantiate the claim of a reurbani- 
zation effect of environmental policy, we have to show that 
A characteristic function @ of a density function is defined 
as (Fisz, 1 9 7 3 )  
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where X i s  an a u x i l i a r y  v a r i a b l e ,  and i = J-1. 
The second moment ( m 2 )  of  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  
- a'@ ( a t  A = 0 )  m 2 - - -  3 x 9  
s o  w e  o b t a i n  
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  m2 wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  z  w e  g e t  
W e  c l a im  t h a t  
S ince  w e  p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  popu la t i on  remains unchanged i n  
s i z e  and on ly  changes i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ove r  space ,  w e  must 
a l s o  have 
The i n t e g r a l  ove r  t h e  urban a r e a  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  popula-  
t i o n .  The p o p u l a t i o n  d i f f e r e n c e  when p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
changed must be e q u a l  t o  ze ro .  But i f  t h e  a r e a  under t h e  
curve  remains t h e  same, t h e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n s  w i th  o r  w i thou t  
z  have t o  i n t e r s e c t  (see a l s o  F igu re s  3 and 4 ) .  Before  t h e  
i n t e r s e c t i o n  p o i n t ,  toward r = 0, t h e  c i t y  is  more compact 
i f  i t s  d e n s i t y  curve  l i e s  above t h e  cu rve  of  t h e  d i s p e r s e d  
city. After the intersection point, toward the periphery, 
the reverse must hold. 
For the compact city, hence, we must observe that toward 
the center, policy must shift d upwards, i.e., dZ > 0 at r + 0. 
At the intersection point, policy measures do not affect the 
density curve at all, i.e., d = 0; outside the intersection 
z 
points then dZ < 0 must hold. (For details see Schubert, 1979). 
What has to be demonstrated in the following then is 
as r changes. We will do this by trying to show that dZ > 0 
at r - 0. The general shape of dZ will also give some indi- 
cation of the possible adjustment processes set off by environ- 
ment policy in all the markets and in the residual concentra- 
tion relation. 
5.2. Environmental Policy and Abatement 
In this paper we are dealing with abatement policies by 
the urban authorities. In principle, there are two kinds of 
abatement. Emissions can be controlled by purchasing and 
operating equipment (e.g., exhaust fume filters in automobiles, 
noise insulation on lawn mowers, etc.), or the effects of 
residual concentration can be mitigated (e.g., insulation 
in houses against outside noise, private air purification, etc.). 
But not all policies provide an incentive to invest in anti- 
pollution devices. 
Without explicit policy (e.g., Ruff, 1972; Schubert,l973) 
individual abatement against emissions is highly unlikely. 
Individuals will purchase equipment to the extent that the 
marginal benefits from a lower concentration of residuals 
exceeds the marginal cost of buying and operating it. A 
control of emissions is hence only likely in the case of 
individuals whose own emissions constitute a good part of the 
ambient residual concentration experienced by them. (If one's 
own - noise and smoke is the most severe environmental problem, 
one will do something about it -- which is hardly ever the 
case at higher densities of land use, where it is mostly 
the neighborhood effects that determine enviornmental quality. 
This is even more true of commuting pollution.) 
We will not explicitly analyze changes in production and 
consumption technology (abatement sets in after the waste has 
been produced). In order to do so, a disaggregated model 
would be necessary differentiating between different kinds 
of technologies, inputs, goods, and transportation modes. 
Zmissions in our model are seen to depend only on the total 
activity level. 
In order to assess the impact of some environmental poli- 
cies within our simultaneous system, the model has to be 
extended. First, a market for "abatement factors" (NP) has 
to be added; specifically we will have to analyze the impact 
of environmental policy on the demand for NP. The price p NP 
will be treated as exogenous. Most of these measures have 
consequences on other markets as well, usually via the "income 
effect". 
5.3. A Market for Abatement Devices 
Consumers and producers can purchase devices to reduce 
emissions. (Again note that waste cannot be reduced due to 
the law of conservation of mass, but harmful residuals, de- 
fined as "emissions" in this analysis, can be reduced.) In 
equilibrium the total demand for abatement devices has to be 
equal to their supply. 
Total demand: N P ~  = NP D D firms + NP households 
S Total supply: NP , exogenous 
Hence, w e  have  N P ~  = NP' = NP. The p r i c e  o f  t h e s e  d e v i c e s ,  
pNP, i s  c o n s i d e r e d  exogenous ,  N P ~  c a n  b e  found  by l o o k i n g  a t  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  l a n d  u s e r s .  I n  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i -  
b r ium,  NP a s  one  o f  t h e  (endogenous)  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  i s  
a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s .  
I n  t h i s  case t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  NP = F u n c t i o n  (exogenous  
v a r i a b l e s ,  p a r a m e t e r s ) .  W e  w i l l  a n a l y z e  t h e  i m p a c t s  o f  v a r i o u s  
p o l i c i e s  on t h i s  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  f i r s t  and t h e n  
a s s e s s  t h e  "sys tem-impact" .  T h e r e  r e m a i n s  a prob lem,  however.  
F i rms  s u p p l y i n g  a b a t e m e n t  d e v i c e s  a l s o  p o l l u t e .  ( T h e i r  
a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s  are NP.) When a l l  p r o d u c t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  
i n  t h e  u r b a n  a r e a  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t i o n  
c o u l d  ou twe igh  t h e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  v i a  f i l t e r i n g ,  etc .  Looking 
a t  R now, it becomes 
But  what  i s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  NP on  R? The a b a t e m e n t  e f f e c t  
d e c r e a s e s  R ,  b u t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  NP i n c r e a s e s  it. To 
f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  w e  w i l l  assume t h a t  aR/aNP = RNp 
h a s  a  n e g a t i v e  n e t  e f f e c t  o n  r e s i d u a l  c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  
(RNp < 0 ) .  (The d i f f u s i o n  p r o c e s s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 
w i l l  n o t  be  e x p l i c i t l y  changed  by i n t r o d u c i n g  NP, t h e  i m p l i -  
c a t i o n s  o f  which are  e a s i l y  s e e n . )  
Our s i m u l t a n e o u s  model now becomes 
1 F  : R ( X I  NP, d ,  r )  - R = 0 
In terms of endogenous variables as used before, the z stands 
for a vector of exogenous variables to be analyzed in the 
following sections; p is a vector of relative prices. 
The m i c r o  e c o n o m i c  b a c k g r o u n d  
Maximum allowable emission rates are set (E) .  Violations 
of the set standards are fined. This fine rises linearly with 
the emission excess, i.e., total fine: (E-E)F, where F > 0, 
X and E =E(X,NP) or E~O=E(~,NP), or F is an emission fee to be 
paid per unit of emitted residuals. The household's decision 
problem is 
Max. u(Xt q, a, 2 )  
Assuming second-order conditions to hold, we can find the 
first derivatives of the appropriate Lagrangian and set 
them equal to zero, which will yield a system of simultaneous 
equations. 
We can solve these simultaneous equations implicitly by 
E D D defining X ,q , and NP ; these solutions will be defined in terms 
X 
of prices (p , pq, pNP) , and the exogenous variables TC,a,H,~,2ra. 
How do  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a f f e c t  t h e  demand f o r  
f o r  X ,  q ,  a n d  NP? A s  some o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  have  been  o u t l i n e d  
b e f o r e ,  w e  w i l l  o n l y  l o o k  a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
NPF and  NPB, NP NP, NPA, NPR, P N P ~ ~  
PF - > 0 (as t h e  f i n e  i n c r e a s e s  it p a y s  t o  a b a t e  more) 
NPE 5 0 , NPpNP < 0,  NPA = 0,  NPR % 0,  NPTC < 0 
A s  l o n g  a s  E  < E, t h e r e  w i l l  b e  no  e f f e c t  o f  F  o r  B. The 
a n a l o g o u s  p rob lem f o r  t h e  u r b a n  f i r m  is  
Max. rr = p X ~  - (pqq + wL + p N P ~ ~  + F(E-E) + TC) 
For  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e q u a t i o n s  w e  c a n  a g a i n  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s u p p l y  
o f  X a n d  t h e  demand f o r  L, q  a n d  NP i n  t e r m s  o f  p r i c e s  and  
t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s .  W e  need  now 
NPTC < 0 
NP- < 0 E 
D L e t  NP' = NP = NP; t h e n  NP i s  t h e  ( p a r t i a l )  e q u i l i b r i u m  
s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  demand=supply c o n d i t i o n  i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  
I t  i s  d e f i n e d  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s ,  i . e . ,  
From t h i s  w e  g e t  
NP X NP = NP(p t p  t p q t  w t  y ,  R t  T C t  Ft E) 
E f f e c t s  o f  a b a t e m e n t  demand i n  t h e  s i m u Z t a n e o u s  mode2 
Adding t h e  i m p l i c i t  e q u a t i o n  t o  t h e  s i m u l t a n e o u s  model 
i m p l i e s  t h e  f d l l o w i n g  s t r u c t u r e  ( u s i n g  pq/pX = p  a g a i n ,  
X 
s e t t i n g  p  = 1 ) : 
1 F : R ( X ,  NP, d ,  r )  - R =  0 
3 NP 
F' : P ( Y ,  w ,  p  , R t  a ,  TC,  F, E) - p  = o 
from which t h e  f o l l o w i n g  J a c o b i a n  m a t r i x  can  b e  d e r i v e d  ( t h e  
s i g n s  o f  p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s ) .  A s  i n  
Tab le  1 ,  w e  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  J a c o b i a n  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  p o s i t i v e  
and a  n e g a t i v e  b ranch  and a  p o i n t  where I J J  v a n i s h e s .  The 
l o c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  " t u r n i n g  p o i n t "  o f  t h e  s i g n s  o f  e f f e c t s  
depends on r ,  o f  which J w i l l  be p o s i t i v e  f o r  s m a l l  v a l u e s ,  
and n e g a t i v e  f o r  l a r g e  ones .  
Table  2 .  The d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  t h e  s i m u l t a n e o u s ,  i m p l i c i t  form 
e q u a t i o n s  w i t h  a  market  f o r  aba tement  equipment  
added t o  t h e  model. 
L e t  us  f i r s t  s e e  whe the r  t h e r e  w i l l  be  any demand f o r  
p o l l u t i o n  aba tement  equipment  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  when f e e s  ( f i n e s )  
a r e  cha rged  on e m i s s i o n s :  i. e . ,  NP: > 0 
NP: = by C r a m e r ' s  r u l e  
I T I  

Let us look at the components of this expression individually. 
F* - Collecting emission fees (fines) tends to increase 
density directly, as less land can be afforded by 
land users. The higher density deteriorates en- 
vironmental quality, which makes land prices fall 
-- but this makes it possible to purchase more 
antipollution devices. 
F3 - As income has to be spent on emission fees, less 
can be paid for land, but this makes demand for 
NP go down, thus worsening environmental quality. 
This could affect activity levels and consequently 
R. Lower land prices permit the pruchase of more 
abatement equipment; R decreases. This leaves 
land users satisfied with smaller lots, which 
makes density go up, but at the same time increases 
residuals. 
F' - Expenditures for X decrease with rising emission 
fees; consequently there is less emission and 
environmental quality rises. Land prices now 
go up, which leaves less income to be spent on 
abatement. 
As emission fees become higher, land users attempt 
to emit less to save and the demand for NP shifts 
upwards. More abatement implies better environ- 
mental quality, a possible change in activity 
levels, and thus the concentration of residuals. 
As R goes down land prices rise, decreasing acti- 
vity levels, and further improving environmental 
quality. 
The h i g h e r  l a n d  p r i c e s  a l s o  i n c r e a s e  d e n s i t y ,  c a u s i n g  
a  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y .  D e n s i t y  t e n d s  t o  
i n c r e a s e  a l s o  a s  R d e c r e a s e s  b e c a u s e  o f  more a b a t e m e n t  and 
l a n d  u s e r s  demand less l a n d ,  t h u s  improv ing  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
2 q u a l i t y  f u r t h e r .  The c h a i n s  o f  e f f e c t s  i n  F  , F3, a n d  F  5 
s u p p o r t  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  e m i s s i o n  
f e e s  ( f i n e s )  t e n d  t o  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  a n t i -  
p o l l u t i o n  d e v i c e s ;  F4  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n .  
L e t t i n g  r + 0 l e a v e s  u s  w i t h  I J  NF ( F )  ( > o .  
AS I J I  a n d  l ~ ~ ~ ( ~ )  I are p o s i t i v e  a t  l o c a t i o n s  c l o s e  t o  
t h e  c e n t e r ,  w h i l e  t h e  r e v e r s e  h o l d s  f o r  s u b u r b a n  l o c a t i o n s ,  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  f i n e s  ( f e e s )  w i l l  c a u s e  a p o s i t i v e  demand 
f o r  a b a t e m e n t  d e v i c e s . ( T h e r e  i s  a s m a l l  zone where t h e r e  i s  
no demand a t  a l l . )  Does t h i s  i n d u c e d  demand f o r  a n t i p o l l u t i o n  
d e v i c e s  t e n d  t o  d e c r e a s e  t h e  s e c o n d  moment o f  t h e  r e s i d u a l  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  f u n c t i o n ?  W e  w i l l  a g a i n  u s e  d: f o r  o u r  a rgumen t .  
W e  r e p l a c e  t h e  s e c o n d  column o f  ( J (  by 
Anaiyzlng i n d i v i d u a l  components,  a g a i n  w e  o b t a i n  
2 F - "Volun ta ry"  abatement  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
g r e a t e r  d e n s i t y .  (Higher  f i n e s  i n c r e a s e  d e n s i t y ,  
a l l o w i n g  R t o  go up ,  and l a n d  p r i c e s  t o  d rop .  
T h i s  makes abatement  i n c r e a s e  and R f a l l . )  The 
e m i s s i o n - r e s i d u a l  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  e f f e c t  i s  n e g l i g i b l e ;  
t h e r e  a r e  t w o  o p p o s i t e  s i g n s .  
3 NP )% makes d  i n c r e a s e .  (Higher  F - The t e r m  (qRRNp 
f e e s  make l a n d  p r i c e s  f a l l ,  abatement  i n c r e a s e ,  
R d r o p  and w i t h  it t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  d e s i r e d  l o t ,  
and d e n s i t y  d  go up. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  
i n c r e a s e d  p r i c e  p  h a s t h e  o p p o s i t e  e f f e c t  a g a i n  
v i a  t h e  demand f o r  l a n d  and goods . )  The n e t  e f f e c t  
a g a i n  i s  most l i k e l y  n e g l i g i b l e  i n  q u a n t i t y .  
F' - T h i s  t e r m  d e f i n i t e l y  i n c r e a s e s  d e n s i t y .  
F' - A s  f e e s  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  demand f o r  N P  becomes h i g h e r  
and R d r o p s ,  which makes l a n d  p r i c e s  go  up (and  
hence  d  i n c r e a s e s ) .  Better e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  
makes l a n d  u s e r s  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  s m a l l e r  l o t s  (d  
i n c r e a s e s  a l s o ) .  The n e t  e f f e c t  i s  p o s i t i v e .  
4 D e n s i t y  e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  goods (F ) and a n t i p o l l u t i o n  
5 d e v i c e  (F ) m a r k e t s  are p o s i t i v e .  The e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  
components o f  t h e  model ( env i ronmen t  and  l a n d  m a r k e t )  are 
ambiguous.  I t  s h o u l d  be  men t ioned ,  however ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
more terms p o i n t i n g  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  h i g h e r  d e n s i t i e s  
t owards  t h e  c e n t e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  case o f  n o  m a r k e t  f o r  a b a t e -  
ment d e v i c e s  (see S h u b e r t ,  1 9 7 9 ) .  
Summing up,  it seems p l a u s i b l e  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  d e n s i t y  
i n  t h e  u rban  c o r e  r e g i o n s  w i l l  i c r e a s e  ( n o t e  t h a t  I J I  i s  
p o s i t i v e  f o r  s m a l l  r )  and t h e  d e n s i t y  i n  t h e  u r b a n  r i n g  
w i l l  d e c r e a s e ,  a  p r o c e s s  o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  " r e u r b a n i z a t i o n "  
( v .  d .  Berg ,  e t  a l .  1 9 8 1 ) .  
6 .  SUMMARY 
The model p r e s e n t e d  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  a n  u r b a n  s y s t e m  
r e s p o n d s  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  ( exogenous )  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s  i n  a  
v e r y  complex way. E f f e c t s  are u s u a l l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i n  
d i r e c t i o n  and  s i z e ,  and  t h e  n e t  outcome c a n  o n l y  be  d e t e r -  
mined by means o f  e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s .  Unhappi ly  a l l  t h e  
n e c e s s a r y  d a t a  f o r  s u c h  a n  e n t e r p r i s e  are n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  
It seems p l a u s i b l e ,  however ,  t h a t  i f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  
o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n  ( f i n e s  o r  f e e s  on e x c e s s i v e  
e m i s s i o n s )  w e r e  employed,  t h e r e  would be  a t e n d e n c y  toward  a 
more compact  c i t y  which coukd ou twe igh  t h e  " d i s u r b a n i z a t i o n "  
e f f e c t s .  
A serious drawback of the model used for this analysis 
is its being static. Cities and systems of cities seem to 
follow life cycles of growth and decline and concentration 
and dispersion (v.d. Berg, et al. 1981). In each stage of 
development there appear to be characteristic constellations 
of the relevant variables, a fact that makes comparative 
statics only relevant within narrow margins. 
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APPENDIX: L i s t  o f  V a r i a b l e s  
H . . . . . .  
C T . . . . . .  
L . . . . . .  
N P . . . . . .  
" a c c e s s i b i l i t y "  ( t o t a l  t r a v e l i n g  t ime  from 
l o c a t i o n .  t o  c i t y  c e n t e r )  
t r a v e l l i n g  t i m e  p e r  zone 
c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  network 
consumption t a x  
" d e n s i t y "  (number o f  l a n d  u s e r s  p e r  zone)  
e m i s s i o n s  (due t o  X and commuting) 
t o t a l  e m i s s i o n s  
f e e  ( f i n e )  p e r  u n i t  o f  ( e x c e s s )  e m i s s i o n  
J a c o b i a n  m a t r i x  ( d e t e r m i n a n t )  o f  p a r t i a l  de- 
r i v a t i v e s  
l a b o r  
p o l l u t i o n  abatement  equipment 
t o t a l  number o f  l a n d  u s e r s  o u t s i d e  a zone 
p r o f i t  o f  an urban f i r m  
p r i c e s  o f  N P ,  q X 
T C . .  . . . .  
a r e a  o f  an urban l o t  ( q u a n t i t y  o f  l a n d )  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of  r e s i d u a l s  
d i s t a n c e  from t h e  c e n t e r  
t i m e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t  
u t i l i t y  i ndex  of  an urban household  
wage r a t e  
q u a n t i t y  o f  a g g r e g a t e  consumption good 
income o f  an u rban  household  
v e c t o r  o f  exogenous v a r i a b l e s  
P a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s  a r e  deno ted  by lower c a s e  le t te rs  
( e . g .  = Rr 1 ,  second p a r t i a l s  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  by a super -  
a r 
a L ~  2 
script  2 ( e . 9 .  - 7 = R - ) .  
ar" I 
a R  T i m e  d e r i v a t i v e s  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  by a d o t  (e  .g. = R )  . 
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